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ABSTRACT
If one believes that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, there are 
numerous ways to argue for that conclusion. In this paper, classic 
utilitarian and rights-based attempts to ground this obligation are con-
sidered, as well as Cora Diamond’s reframing of the debate in terms 
of the proper way to view other animals. After discussion of these 
three ways to ground the obligation and their problems, an attitude-
based approach inspired by Diamond’s view (though different from 
it in important ways) is advanced. It is argued that such a view, by 
focusing moral attention on the attitudes of agents as opposed to the 
actions they undertake, captures the important insights of all three 
views, while offering a better grounding for the obligation. This view 
is superior in that it (1) succeeds in explaining the wrongness of a 
problem case, (2) without committing one to rights or to a troublingly 
subjective understanding of moral concepts.
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1. Introduction
It is usually acknowledged that non-human animals can be 
the proper objects of moral concern. The question of which 
non-human animals are the proper objects of that concern is not 
settled, nor is the question of the constraints that that moral con-
cern puts on behavior; however, it is usually granted that there 
are ways in which it is wrong to treat some non-human beings. 
Torturing kittens, for example, is generally acknowledged to be 
wrong. What is interesting is that eating non-human animals is 
not always (or even often) thought to be one of the prohibited 
ways of treating them. Although there are those who argue that 
it is morally impermissible to eat non-human animals (Singer 
1974 and 2002; Regan 2004; Norcross 2004; McMahan 2008), 
it is by no means the standard view. Furthermore, among those 
who do argue for vegetarianism, there is disagreement as to the 
scope and ground of the obligation involved.  Some argue that 
sentient animals have a right to freedom from harm that is vio-
lated by raising them for food and killing them (Regan 2004), 
while others argue that it is primarily the pain and suffering that 
accompany animal industries that renders them impermissible 
(Singer 2002). Like any practical question in moral philosophy, 
theoretical commitments shape the answers that are given to 
the question, and the success of those answers is a function 
of the strength of the underlying theory. In this paper, the vir-
tues and vices of representative arguments for vegetarianism 
will be discussed, and an alternative to these arguments will be 
proposed. Although there is much to recommend both standard 
utilitarian and rights-based arguments for vegetarianism, it will 
be argued that the important insights of both can be better ac-
commodated by an attitude-based argument rather than by the 
standard act-based arguments.
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2. Standard Views
Among those who advocate for vegetarianism (both philos-
ophers and non-philosophers alike), some form of utilitarian-
ism is the most common explanatory ground (Singer 1974 and 
2002; Norcross 2004; Pollan 2007; Robbins 1987). The reason 
for this is not surprising; raising, killing, and eating sentient 
creatures involves causing their deaths, and in many cases 
causing pain to them, and so it is intuitively plausible that this 
needs to be justified. If one is drawn to vegetarianism it is of-
ten because, when attempting to justify this pain, one weighs it 
against whatever reasons one has for causing it and finds that 
such reasons do not offer justification. This lack of justification 
is even clearer in our modern society, which causes more than 
just the pain and the loss of future pleasure that result from 
killing non-human animals (or, the frustration of an interest in, 
or preference for, remaining alive, depending on one’s view), 
but immense pain and suffering in their pre-slaughter lives as 
well. The simple fact of pain and suffering provides a compel-
ling reason to remove oneself from participation in the institu-
tion that causes it, and so many people who abstain from eating 
meat do so for this reason.
The obvious intuitive appeal of such arguments (surely it 
is better not to cause pain and suffering if one can help it!), 
coupled with the indisputable fact of the pain and suffering 
caused to non-human animals in animal industries (Singer 
2002), provides a solid base for arguing that vegetarianism 
is morally obligatory. However, despite the intuitive appeal 
of this view, there are problems with utilitarian justifications 
of vegetarianism. These problems have largely to do with the 
identification of the value that one is morally obligated to pro-
mote. The problem can be illustrated with a somewhat fanciful 
science fiction example: Imagine that one of the major chicken 
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restaurants, having received much flak for undercover foot-
age of the abusive treatment of the chickens it raises, decides 
to breed a whole new kind of chicken. This chicken will look 
and taste exactly like the chickens that we are used to, but it 
will specifically be bred to feel no pain and have no conscious 
awareness. In essence, the chickens will be very much like seri-
ously brain-damaged chickens, but in the case of this breed, the 
brain-damage will be the norm. What could possibly be wrong 
with this, on a utilitarian view? The chickens are incapable of 
suffering or having interests, so no matter how one treats them, 
that treatment cannot be wrong; the chickens are, in essence, 
meat plants.
Of course, it is open to a utilitarian proponent of vegetarian-
ism to argue that nothing would be wrong with breeding, rais-
ing, killing, and eating such chickens. However, this position 
highlights one of the unsatisfactory features of utilitarianism 
(Regan 2004, 200-211). Utilitarianism focuses its theoretical 
attention on individuals as loci of morally salient experiences, 
which is one of the reasons it successfully grounds obligations 
to non-human animals. No matter what the nature of the in-
dividual, if it suffers, that suffering matters morally, and the 
individual matters as a source of suffering.  However, one only 
matters morally as such a source (since it is the suffering alone 
that is morally salient), so any individual that fails to be (or 
ceases to be) such a source does not matter morally. Treatment 
of individuals matters because those individuals suffer, so if 
one abstracts the capacity for suffering, the individuals do not 
matter.
Many proponents of utilitarianism find this feature of it par-
ticularly appealing—on their view, it is sentimentalism (at best) 
or speciesism (at worst) to think that non-sentient individuals 
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matter morally simply because they look like individuals that 
are sentient, or because they would have been sentient without 
defect. Given this feature of the utilitarian view, there seems to 
be no wrongness involved in the chicken example. However, 
there is reason to think that something is going wrong here; 
this example involves the deliberate attempt to circumvent 
what is morally salient about an individual in order to remove 
one’s obligations to it, and such behavior is intuitively suspect. 
Consider, for example, that it would seem a bad defense for 
killing a person to point out that when you killed him, he was 
brain-damaged from the blow to the head you gave him first, 
and thus no longer a proper object of moral duties. Even if the 
subsequent treatment of the individual cannot be considered 
wrong, there must be an explanation of the moral dubiousness 
of acting in this way, and it seems unlikely that this will be a 
utilitarian explanation. The most promising utilitarian explana-
tion seems to be that doing this would make one more likely to 
disregard the interests of chickens that are sentient, thus caus-
ing more suffering in the long run (Singer 2002)—but it seems 
that even one instance of this manipulation, done in isolation 
from any other chickens, is morally amiss. If, on the other hand, 
one attempts to argue that there is nothing wrong with acting in 
this way, then the example could be easily altered to describe 
genetically altered, non-sentient human beings, with the same 
moral conclusion. 
Hard-line utilitarians might argue that there would be nothing 
wrong with eating human beings that had been bred to be non-
sentient from birth.  But there is something morally troubling 
about trying to engineer individuals that lack the one feature 
that gives rise to their moral status so that one can treat them 
as objects that have none. In what follows, it will be argued 
that this sort of behavior is wrong because it displays a morally 
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deficient attitude towards sentient beings. First, however, two 
non-utilitarian arguments for vegetarianism will be considered, 
in order to illustrate the need for the alternative view. 
If one is not a utilitarian, the most common alternative rea-
son given for vegetarianism is rights-based; it is a violation of 
the rights of non-human animals to raise and kill them for food 
(Regan 2004). According to rights-based arguments, the reason 
it is wrong to eat meat is not simply the fact that the produc-
tion of it causes suffering and death, but that the imposition of 
such suffering and death are violations of the rights of the non-
human animals involved.  
Tom Regan argues for such a view, and his arguments are 
Kant-inspired, though he rejects the Kantian grounding of mo-
rality in autonomous moral legislation. According to Regan, 
any being that is a subject of a life (where this means that one 
has a point of view from which life can go better or worse for 
one) has basic moral rights, because all such subjects have in-
herent value, worth, and dignity over and above their use to 
others. Included in these basic moral rights is the right not to 
be harmed. Given what goes on in the animal agriculture indus-
try, raising and killing non-human animals for food (or keeping 
them in order to lay eggs or give milk) is clearly a violation of 
their rights.
Rights-based views provide more stringent prohibitions on 
the same sorts of behavior that utilitarian views prohibit. How-
ever, in order to achieve this stringency, proponents of such 
views posit rights, and this in turn raises worries about the na-
ture and existence of moral rights themselves. To take Regan’s 
view, one might wonder if all subjects of lives have inherent 
value, and whether that inherent value gives rise to rights.  How 
Elizabeth Foreman
59
© Between the Species, 2014
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 17, Issue 1
does a fact of value generate an obligation? Regan provides 
an argument for this view, but in rejecting Kantian support for 
such a position (i.e., Kant’s complicated story about autonomy 
and its relationship to the moral law), Regan opts to reach his 
conclusion through a process of reflective equilibrium concern-
ing our most settled and core intuitions (2004). Whether we do 
have core, settled intuitions about basic moral obligations is not 
absolutely clear, but even if it were, the extra step from intu-
itions about our obligations to the existence of rights is highly 
contentious; many people may acknowledge that we ought not 
harm non-human animals unnecessarily, or treat them in ways 
inconsistent with respect for their value, but the assertion that 
these facts mean they have rights against us (conceived by 
Regan and others as “valid claims”) is more contentious. Few 
theories of rights posit a ground for rights that extends them 
to non-human beings (Feinberg 1970; Hart 1955; Mill 2001; 
Rawls 1971). Those views may be wrong, but the invocation of 
rights seems to be an unnecessarily contentious step in an oth-
erwise appealing argument that non-human animals are not to 
be treated in ways that violate respect for their dignity (which 
is the intuitive basis for most moral rights claims).
Even setting this problem aside, however, rights-based argu-
ments will still have a hard time explaining what is wrong with 
the science-fiction chicken example. The non-sentient chickens 
will not have rights (on Regan’s view, for example, they will not 
be subjects of lives, and so will not have rights), and so using 
them as food resources will not be a rights-issue. However one 
understands rights, appealing to them does not seem to offer an 
explanation for the problem in this case. In the final section of 
this paper, it will be argued that the insights of a rights-based 
view are salvageable without actually asserting the existence 
of rights, and that a view that avoids such an assertion is more 
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successful than one that does. However, discussion of another 
kind of reason for vegetarianism must come first.
3. An Alternative to the Standard View from 
Cora Diamond
Not all philosophers who argue for vegetarianism argue in 
one of the two ways just described. One notable argument for 
the possibility of vegetarianism’s being morally required (al-
though it does not come to that definitive conclusion) is offered 
by Cora Diamond. According to Diamond, if one wants to es-
tablish that vegetarianism is obligatory, one shouldn’t attempt 
the sort of act-based arguments advocated by both utilitarians 
and rights-theorists. The question is not whether it is wrong to 
eat animals because there is some fact about them that makes 
that action wrong; rather, the question is whether eating ani-
mals can be seen to be inconsistent with a proper view of them. 
On Diamond’s view, the right way to argue for vegetarianism 
is not to try to find some feature of non-human animals that 
prohibits us from eating them (that they have interests, or that 
they are subjects of lives), but rather to examine our reasons 
for not eating people. According to Diamond, the reason we do 
not eat people is not that they suffer, or that they have rights, 
but because they are people, and people are not something to 
eat (1978, 467).  
On Diamond’s view, “people” is a moral category, and those 
beings that fall in that category are not “something to eat.”  The 
question, then, is whether non-human animals should proper-
ly be thought of as a kind that is “not something to eat.” On 
Diamond’s view, these categories are constructed by humans 
in the context of relationships with others; there is no objec-
tive ground (subjectivity, capacity to have interests, etc.) for 
membership in that category. The moral ground of prohibitions 
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against eating is that we are in moral relationships with others 
that preclude our eating them, and so the category “person” 
includes that prohibition by nature of the relationship that cre-
ates it. Whether human beings have such a relationship with 
other, non-human animals is an open question, according to 
Diamond. However, she believes that it is not improper to view 
non-human animals as “fellow creatures,” as illustrated by her 
use of a Walter de la Mare poem,
…this indicates a direction of thought very unlike that 
of the Singer argument. There we start supposedly 
from the biological fact that we and dogs and rats and 
titmice and monkeys are all species of animal, differ-
entiated indeed in terms of this or the other capacity, 
but what is appropriate treatment for members of our 
species would be appropriate to members of any whose 
capacities gave them similar interests….explicitly in 
the de la Mare, we have a different notion, that of liv-
ing creature, or fellow creature—which is not a biolog-
ical concept. It does not mean, biologically an animal, 
something with biological life—it means a being in a 
certain boat…The response to animals as our fellows 
in mortality, in life on this earth…depends upon a con-
ception of human life. It is an extension of a non-bio-
logical notion of what human life is (1978, 474).
According to Diamond, the fact that non-human animals are 
subjects of lives, or that they have interests, is not something 
that can be read off of empirical features of the beings in ques-
tion; instead, that something is seen as an “animal” signifies 
that one is in a certain relationship with it, and that relationship 
carries with it certain responses. Further, the fact that an animal 
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has a “life” is not read off of biological facts about it either, but 
is instead merely an expression of our relationship with it.
Diamond’s ultimate conclusion is that factory farming is 
probably inconsistent with seeing another living thing as a “fel-
low creature” with a life, but that eating a non-human animal 
might not be. Presumably, this is because the constructed cat-
egories that delineate moral responses are different for non-
human animals from what they are for human beings; the kind 
“animal,” though including a “fellow creature” response that 
precludes the horrors of factory farming, is still of the “animal 
life” category and not the “person life” category, and so our re-
lationship to, and understanding of, that life need not preclude 
eating it.
This line of argument seems to solve many of the problems 
with utilitarian and rights-based arguments. Starting from the 
intuitively persuasive thought that the reason we do not eat 
people is not the sort of reason given by utilitarianism or a 
rights-based view (who ever considered eating a human being, 
but thought better of it because it would be a rights-violation?), 
the argument re-imagines the moral situation from the point of 
view of the moral agent, and not from facts about the object of 
the act. However, the problem with this sort of view is one of 
methodology.  Appealing to the sorts of categories we construct, 
and then reading morality off of these constructed categories, 
leaves the business of morality far too arbitrary. Diamond is 
careful to note that the argumentative strategy she is proposing 
will not work if the person towards whom it is directed does not 
have a “fellow creature” response to non-human animals; such 
a person will most likely not be persuaded by an argument for 
vegetarianism that rests on this response. However, she argues 
that this is not a fatal flaw, since no one who rejects utilitarian-
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ism will be persuaded by Singer’s strategy of identifying non-
human animals as morally important. If one is not convinced 
that having interests is what grounds moral status, then one will 
be unconvinced by Singer’s arguments that non-human animals 
must not be eaten because they meet this criterion. 
There is an asymmetry, however, between the assumptions 
Singer asks one to make and the assumptions that Diamond 
asks one to make. On Singer’s view, the facts about non-human 
animals are not in question; what is in question is the norma-
tive importance of those facts. Is the capacity to have interests 
what is ultimately morally salient about non-human animals? 
Perhaps it is, and perhaps it is not. However, this capacity can-
not be denied, and given that it is a capacity we share, its im-
portance cannot be denied either, even if there is disagreement 
about how important it is (can anyone seriously deny, for exam-
ple, that it would be bad for a cat to have her paws sawed off?).
Diamond, on the other hand, rejects the idea that once cer-
tain empirical facts are granted, normative facts could easily 
follow. On her view, moral responses are contextual and arise 
from human category constructions. Even if it is true that a cat 
feels pain, that she is a “fellow creature” is not yet established; 
in order for it to be true that a being is a “fellow creature,” one 
must be in a relationship with it, must see it that way.  Although 
she seems to argue that non-human animals are properly seen 
as “fellow creatures,” nothing in the way she argues can es-
tablish that for certain. In order to establish that, there must 
be facts about a being that call for a certain categorization, a 
certain response, but her understanding of moral construction 
rules that out.  Says Diamond, 
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…it is not a fact that a titmouse has a life; if one speaks 
that way it expresses a particular relation within a 
broadly specifiable range to titmice…Animals—these 
objects we are acting upon—are not given for our 
thought independently of such a mass of ways of think-
ing about and responding to them. This is part of what 
I meant earlier when I dismissed the idea of saying of 
something that whatever concepts it fell under, it was 
capable of suffering and so ought not to be made to suf-
fer… (1978, 475-476).
Given this view of how our concepts function in order to create 
moral categories, it seems unlikely that someone who endorses 
this view could try to appeal to the person who doesn’t have 
the “fellow creature” response—for nothing in the view seems 
to require that she have that response. In the absence of that 
requirement, the force of the response does not seem to really 
establish any sort of universal wrong.
Despite this, though, the idea that a commitment to vegetari-
anism is a matter of seeing non-human animals as “something 
not to eat” is one that is worth preserving, and Diamond’s at-
tempts to ground arguments for vegetarianism in our way of 
seeing our “fellow creatures” is promising. However, it would 
be better to avoid the arbitrary nature of the arguments, and find 
a firmer grounding for an attitude-based argument for vegetari-
anism.  In the next section, such an argument will be proposed.
4. An Attitude-Based View
Diamond’s approach gets to the heart of what is really wrong 
with eating meat—what is wrong with it is not only, or primar-
ily, that one has failed in an obligation to the animal that one 
eats. What is primarily wrong with eating meat is that seeing 
Elizabeth Foreman
65
© Between the Species, 2014
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 17, Issue 1
non-human animals as something to eat is inappropriate, and 
the subsequent eating of animals is wrong because of this.
This view of the matter sits well with the insights gained 
from both utilitarian and rights-based arguments for vegetarian-
ism. Using an animal as a mere means to further one’s interests 
is at the root of what is wrong with consuming animal products, 
and inflicting harm for trivial pleasure is also wrong-generat-
ing. Animal-rights advocates focus on the former as primar-
ily grounding the impermissibility of eating animal products, 
whereas utilitarians focus on the latter as the wrong-making 
feature of that act. However, focusing on which feature of the 
being in question generates an obligation to refrain from cer-
tain acts involving it is not the only way to understand what is 
wrong with using others as means and inflicting pain on them; 
as discussion of Diamond shows, these conflicting grounds of 
obligation can be collapsed into an understanding of the ways 
in which these actions display the wrong attitude towards an 
object of moral concern. That is, focusing on the inappropri-
ateness of seeing a non-human animal as a mere means, and 
the inappropriateness of the willingness to inflict harm for a 
trivial purpose, can capture the role that the insights of these 
two views actually play in grounding arguments for the wrong-
ness of consuming animal products. By locating the wrongness 
of consuming animal products in the attitude of the agent, and 
not in features of the action, such a view easily explains the 
wrongness of even the science-fiction chicken example, as well 
as the more standard cases. Instead of arguing about whether 
sentience or autonomy is the feature that limits our action con-
cerning certain creatures, we can justify these limits by appeal-
ing to the wrongness of the attitude of an agent who causes pain 
or fails to respect autonomy. 
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By refocusing, one can see that what is wrong with consum-
ing animal products is that, in whatever way one acquires them 
(by killing a non-human animal, by milking a non-human ani-
mal, by keeping a non-human animal in order to gather its eggs, 
etc.), the treatment of the animal is inconsistent with viewing it 
as having the moral status that it has. Of course, moral status is 
something that one has in virtue of having certain features, but 
status is not simply the possession of those features.  Instead, 
moral status is a matter of being of a certain kind—one is the 
sort of thing that must be viewed in certain ways, and mistreat-
ment is in large part a matter of being viewed inappropriately 
given the sort of thing one is. On such a view, wrong acts are 
those that display a bad attitude, where the badness of the at-
titude is grounded in the appropriateness of ways of seeing cer-
tain kinds of creatures. Morally salient facts about creatures 
generate moral status, and acts are wrong if they express a way 
of seeing the creatures that have that status in a way that fails 
to recognize it.
To make this clearer, consider the difference between pulling 
a cat’s teeth because one is worried about her oral health and 
wants to do what is best for her, and removing a cat’s teeth for 
the fun of it. In the former case, one views the cat as a being 
with genuine interests, needs, and (at least basic) preferences 
about how her life will go. In this case, one takes the cat to the 
vet in order to respect her status as a subject, as a being that 
is living a life for which one has taken some responsibility. In 
the latter case, it is not clear how one views the cat, but at the 
very least it seems as if one is viewing the cat inappropriately, 
as an object to do with what one wishes. Even if one were to 
anesthetize the cat before pulling her teeth, be vigilant about 
infection, and alter her diet and her toys so that her toothless 
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life is tolerable, there seems something wrong with removing 
the cat’s teeth for the fun of it.  
A view like Regan’s gets close to explaining why this is so: 
it is a lack of respect for the cat to treat her as if her teeth were 
merely a means for one’s own amusement, and as if the use 
she has for them is unimportant. However, one does not have 
to posit rights at all in order to explain the wrongness of this 
act; even if the cat has no rights to the free and unrestricted 
use of her teeth, the action (even when it does no harm) dis-
plays disrespect towards her. And this disrespect is wrong not 
only for the wrong acts that follow, but wrong in the very at-
titude it displays. Regan wishes to give a firmer grounding to 
our obligations to animals than is provided by utilitarianism, 
and so conceives of a failure to respect non-human animals as 
involving an injustice, a violation of rights that the animals can 
claim against us. That is, he wishes to rule certain actions out 
as simply impermissible because the creatures involved can de-
mand non-performance as their due. However, given that one 
can explain this wrong without appealing to the troublesome 
notion of rights, it seems better to retain the core moral insight 
and drop the appeal to rights. Even without the idea of rights, 
there is a robust wrong that occurs in the case of pulling a cat’s 
teeth for fun—that is, one views (and subsequently treats) a 
non-human animal in a way that is inappropriate to the kind of 
thing that it is. Moral status can generate prohibitions against 
ways of seeing creatures (and the actions that those attitudes 
lead to) without having to generate rights against certain kinds 
of treatment, and the argument from respect paves the way for 
that without need for the extra appeal to rights.
Contra Diamond, however, the appeal here to “what kind 
of thing an animal is” is not a matter of how we happen to see 
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it; “what kind of thing an animal is” is not merely a construc-
tion, a categorization that carries with it certain responses (and 
which is shaped by those responses). A non-human animal is a 
particular kind of thing as a matter of fact, and one is morally 
required to see, and respond to, the kind of thing a creature is 
in ways that are appropriate to its kind. According to this view, 
morality is ultimately a matter of viewing, and responding ap-
propriately, to the world; one’s actions are a good sign of how 
one views the world, but they are not ultimately the basis of 
moral evaluation, since the wrongness of the act of treating an-
other inappropriately ultimately rests in the inappropriate view 
that drives the action. Although full argument for this agent-
centered view is beyond the scope of this article, such a view 
can explain moral evaluation in general, and so (as is the case 
with both utilitarianism and rights-based views) provides an 
argument for vegetarianism that is continuous with arguments 
against harming our fellow human beings.  
This view endorses veganism because most non-human ani-
mals are the sorts of things that are subjects of the morally rele-
vant kind. They lead their own lives from a privileged perspec-
tive (they alone know what it’s like to be them), and this means 
that we must view them as the self-guided creatures that they 
are. To see them otherwise, to see them as merely resources 
for one’s use, is to willfully ignore a morally salient feature 
of their experience. Non-human animals are, as Regan puts it, 
subjects of lives, and ignoring this subjectivity, or thinking that 
it is unimportant in the face of one’s own subjectivity, is to 
have an inappropriate attitude towards what is a fundamentally 
morally important experience. It is important to note here that 
the argument is not that all moral obligations are obligations of 
respect; the claim is simply that being self-guided is the feature 
of experience that gives one moral status, and wrong acts are 
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those that display an attitude that is inappropriate in the face of 
this fact (that is, that fails to see the creature in a way consistent 
with that fact).
This way of understanding wrongness can also explain what 
is wrong with ignoring the pain of a non-human animal, or 
thinking that its pain is unimportant in the face of one’s own. 
Here, Singer’s insights are apt—it is atrocious to think that the 
pain of another living thing is unimportant in the face of one’s 
own desires. But what is atrocious is not just the behavior that 
that thinking engenders, nor is it the fact that such thinking en-
genders an attitude likely to bring about bad behavior. The at-
titude itself is already morally wrong, whether bad behavior 
follows it or not, because it is a failure to see another living 
creature as having moral status; it is a failure to see another liv-
ing creature as more than an object for one’s own use. Singer’s 
attempts to explain the wrongness of certain acts by claiming 
that they engender attitudes that lead to further bad behavior 
adds an unnecessary step to the argument, for the attitude can 
be seen as wrong in itself. And this is in fact more intuitive; if 
we take Singer’s view, one does no wrong if one enjoys watch-
ing a film of a cow being tortured, apart from making oneself 
more likely to torture cows oneself. On the view endorsed here, 
however, enjoying a film in which a cow is tortured is already 
wrong, even if one never goes on to compound that wrong by 
torturing an actual cow.
The reason that veganism is obligatory on this view is that it 
is not necessary for human beings to consume animal products 
in order to survive. Non-human animals are the sorts of things 
that experience and structure their own lives, and the appropri-
ate attitude towards those lives is not only a function of what 
sorts of lives the animals lead, but the sorts of lives that human 
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beings lead as well. If human beings required meat to survive, 
or if they required eggs and dairy products, then the appropriate 
attitude towards other living things would still involve proper 
recognition of their autonomy, but would also involve seeing 
them as things to eat (or as producers of things to eat). Proper 
respect for them would still be necessary, but what that would 
require in terms of attitude and behavior would be a function of 
what sorts of lives human beings had to lead.
Human beings do not need to eat meat or other animal prod-
ucts in order to survive, though, so it is inappropriate to see 
other living creatures as things to eat. Facts about them and 
facts about us make it the case that they are not things for us 
to eat, and seeing them that way is inappropriate. What’s more, 
veganism is explicitly and absolutely required on such a view, 
since one’s attitude to a milking cow or a laying hen is no less 
inappropriate than one’s attitude towards a veal calf—one 
views such creatures as sources of food, as things to milk and 
keep. To see the inappropriateness of such an attitude, one need 
only consider how obscene that attitude would be if one took 
it towards a human being. One need not consume the milk of 
human beings (after a certain age), and so one should not view 
human beings as mere food resources in one’s adulthood.  
On such a view, not only is it wrong to slaughter a cow or 
keep chickens, it is wrong to buy eggs and wrong to purchase 
hamburger. Even if one does not kill the cow or keep the chick-
en as a food resource, buying and consuming those products 
displays an inappropriate attitude toward non-human animals. 
However, rather than having to posit an injustice traceable to 
a particular individual in order to explain this, one need look 
no further than the attitude of the purchaser. One would do the 
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same wrong purchasing Tofurky, mistakenly thinking it was 
once a living bird, as one would do buying an actual turkey.
A view like this one is also able to give a more satisfactory 
answer to the problem raised by the science-fiction chicken 
example. If one manipulates chickens in order to circumvent 
what is morally salient about them, one is already doing wrong, 
because one is viewing chickens inappropriately. If one takes 
seriously that chickens have moral status, then trying to get 
around that status by subtracting the features that help ground 
it expresses a wrong attitude towards the kind of things that 
chickens are (namely, things that normally have those morally 
salient features). Even if the resulting chickens have none of the 
features that grounded the appropriateness of certain attitudes 
towards their predecessors, the act of manipulation that brought 
them about clearly displays a bad attitude towards chickens, 
given the kinds of things that they are. The act of manipulating 
them to bring their non-sentience about is wrong because of the 
attitude this displays towards chickens, towards creatures with 
moral status. Though no sentient individual is harmed, and no 
individuals’ rights are violated, the attitude expressed is already 
wrong. And it is not too much of a stretch to think that this 
would require one not to take advantage of the situation that 
that manipulation brought about. That is, even if the resulting 
chickens have no awareness at all, the act of trying to engineer 
chickens without morally salient characteristics because one 
wishes to eat them (which, given what they are, one ought not 
want to do) displays a bad attitude in itself, and so this can be 
seen as wrong in a way unavailable to those who rest wrong-
ness in facts about the actual creatures involved.  
Elizabeth Foreman
72
© Between the Species, 2014
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 17, Issue 1
5. Conclusion
Although both utilitarian and rights-based arguments for 
vegetarianism have intuitive appeal, they both have problems 
that can be avoided by focusing less on the wrongness of the 
actions that are prohibited, and more on the wrongness of the 
attitudes involved. Taking insights from Cora Diamond’s no-
tion of “seeing another as a fellow creature,” it becomes clear 
that a wrong way of “seeing” non-human animals is at the root 
of what is intuitively appealing about utilitarian and rights-
based arguments. By retaining and focusing on the importance 
of those wrong ways of seeing, one can more successfully ar-
gue for the wrongness of eating non-human animals and their 
products.   
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